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ABSTRACT 
This paper is devoted to the analysis of the real convergence 
process between Spain and the EC and the contribution to this process 
made by the manufacturing industry. The first part places emphasis on 
the peculiar higher convergence recorded by the Spanish economy in 
terms of wages and productivity per worker than in terms of income per 
capita. The very low proportion of employment to population is regarded 
as the main factor leading to that situation. The available data also point 
to a clear relationship of both higher employment and lower wages per 
employee to higher relative income per capita. 
The concept of industrial catching-up is introduced and analyzed 
taking into account the productivity and employment performance in this 
sector. The poor results recorded in terms of industrial catching-up in 
Spain highlight the temporary nature of the improvement in the overall 
real convergence process experienced after the accession to the EC, as 
this was mainly supported by the expansion of the service sector and 
coincided with a period of worsening in Spanish competitiveness. The 
evolution of industrial output shows a certain relationship to the 
performance of the external balance, which stresses the need to preserve 
industrial competitiveness in order to prevent the deterioration of the 
external sector and to make the catching-up process endure. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Following Spanish accession to the EC in 1986 a positive growth 
differential between Spain and the Community countries was recorded up 
to 1991, which led to a narrowing in the relative income gap existing 
between Spain and the EC. The stronger impact of the last recession on 
the Spanish economy brought this process to a halt in the last two years. 
The reduction In that income gap continues being, however, the most 
important medium-term target for Spanish economic policy as It is 
expected to lead to the improvement in the overall standard of living of 
the Spanish population. 
Moreover, this issue is particularly relevant today as the EC is 
engaged in a process which should culminate in an Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) and the catching-up countries want this move to EMU to 
contribute to the real convergence of their economies. Though EMU 
requirements are already changing the economic framework in which 
European countries are evolving, the analysis of the factors which have 
allowed successful catching-up in the past should remain useful to 
determine which conditions could facilitate continuing real convergence. 
Some of these conditions are common to the whole economy but others are 
specific to particular sectors. 
Spanish economic growth after the entry into the EC has not been 
homogeneous across the productive structure: some enterprises have 
already reached an adequate combination of factors, productivity and 
labour cost levels, while others have suffered serious competitiveness 
problems and resisted facing foreign competition. The distinction between 
tradeable and non-tradeable sectors, traditional and modern activities and 
the ownership of the domestic companies by foreign or national inv ... stors 
are useful elements in examining how the different sectors or branches 
have contributed to the overall growth results. 
Thus, a sectoral approach to the catching-up process could allow 
an identification of particular shortcomings which may be relevant for the 
overall economy. The 'European shock' experienced by the Spani�h 
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economy in the last few yeers(l) had its strongest impact on Spanish 
manufacturing industry as this was the sector most open to foreign 
competition. The nature and size of that shock and the response of 
industrial firms to adapt themselves to the new conditions appeered as 
important factors determining whether economic growth (and. hence. the 
catching-up process) could be sustained in the medium term. With a view 
to assessing these factors. the performance of the Spanish manufacturing 
industry in the last decade is analyzed in this paper. 
An overall description of the determinants of the real convergence 
process is given in chapter 2. Catching-up in terms of industrial output 
is introduced and analyzed in chapter 3. A detailed evaluation of the 
performance of Spanish manufacturing industry from a domestic point of 
view is made in chapter 4 while the differences between the manufacturing 
industry in Spain and in the biggest EC countries are described in 
chapter 5 .  Finally. chapter 6 draws the main conclusions. 
(1) The main landmarks of this shock are the accession into the EC 
(1986). the entry of the peseta into the ERM (1989) and the European 
Single Market (1993). The prospect of EMU being in place before the end 
of the century also had important effects on markets' expectations in the 
last few yeers. 
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2. AN OVERALL VIEW OF THE CATCHING-UP PROCESS 
The catching-up process represents the reduction in the gap 
between the GDP per capits in one country as compared with other more 
developed countries. In the European Community this comparison is 
traditionally made measuring the GDP per capits relative to the EC 
average. Thus, with stable populations, if one low-income country 
records a real GDP growth higher than the EC average, a certsin 
progress in the catching-up process is experienced. Spain, together with 
Ireland, Portugal and Greece, are the four countries with a GDP per 
capits clearly below the EC average, thus being the so-called 
'catching-up countries'. 
To permit an adequate comparison, the GDP per capits is adjusted 
by the different purchasing power of the currencies, thus eliminating the 
differences in price levels between countries. Through this adjustment, 
which is made in the EC through the Purchasing Power Stsnderd (PPS) as 
estimated by Eurostst, the evolution of nominal GDP per capits is made 
comparable between countries. 
2.1. Some arithmetic of catching-up 
A decomposition of the GDP per capits in relative terms is made in 
this section to facilitste the later enaiysis of the factors contributing to 
the catching-up process. 
Let Y be the GDP at current prices in Spain measured in PPS terms, 
P the tots! population, N the level of employment and A the labour force. 
Then: 
Y/P= (YIN) * (NIP) = (YIN) * (N/A) * (AlP) (1) 
The GDP per capits in Spain (YIP) is thus equal to the labour 
productivity (YIN) multiplied by the proportion represented by 
employment in relation to tots! population (NIP). This latter magnitude 
can be further decomposed into the product of two ratios: the proportion 
of employment to labour force (NI A) and the proportion of labour force to 
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total population (AlP) which will be called hereafter the participation 
rate(21. 
The same variables marked with an asterisk will denote the 
magnitudes for the EC average. The relative position of Spain in the 
catching-up process is thus defined as: 
(Y IP) I (Y'/P') (2) 
which can be split into: 
(Y IP) I (Y'/P'), [(YIN) I (Y'/N')] " [(NIP) I (N'/P')], 
, [(Y/N)/(y'/N')]" [(N/A)/(N'IA')]" [(A/P)/(A'/P')] (3) 
If relative magnitudes are denoted with an 'r': 
(Y IP)r, (Y IN)r " (N IP)r , (Y IN)r " (N I A)r " (A/P)r (4) 
Thus, the real convergence between Spain and the EC, measured 
by the Spanish GDP per capita as compared to the EC average, can be 
obtained as the product of the relative labour productivity and the 
relative proportion of employment to population. (N/P)r will be called 
hereafter relative employment, (NI A)r relative occupation rate and (A/P)r 
will be the relative participation rate. 
2.2. A brief historical review of the catching-up process in Spain 
In the forties, after the Civil War, Spain experienced an autarchic 
development based on an extended system of regulation and 
protectionism, which allowed national enterprises to grow without being 
much constrained by external competition. Despite these weak 
foundations, the implementation of a stabilization plan in 1959, which 
(2) The participation rate is normally defined as the labour force 
divided by the population over sixteen years. For a matter of simplicity, 
we use that term here for a slightly different concept. 
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introduced some liberalization In foreign trade, and the introduction of 
development plans led Spain to record in the sixties an economic 
expansion stronger than in other western countries .  
This expansion increased the relative income per head in Spain as 
compared to the EC average from 68% in 1964 to 79% in 1975. As shown by 
graph 1, this improvement in the relative GDP per capita was mainly due 
to a sustained increase in relative labour productivity which rose from 74% 
of the EC average in 1964 to 87% in 1975. The relative proportion of 
employment to total population remained stable though below the EC 
average (around 92% of this average). 
In graph 2 relative employment is split, as presented in the former 
section, into the relative occupation and participation rates. From 1964 to 
1975 the occupation rate was very close to the EC average while the 
participation rate was seven points below it . The similar occupation rates 
respond to the full-employment situation recorded by most European 
countries before the first oil crisis. In the Spanish case, this low 
unemployment was favoured by the large flow of emigration towards 
high-income countries which lowered the Spanish labour force. This 
phenomenon, together with the traditional limited involvement of women 
in the Spanish labour force as compared to other European countries, 
explained the lower relative participation rate in Spain. 
The two oil shocks of the seventies and the early eighties revealed 
all the rigidities present in the Spanish economy . In this period the 
economy lacked the adequate responsiveness to the new conditions, partly 
due to the political change that was taking place, leading to a rapid 
growth of unemployment and inflation . Productivity per worker continued 
increasing significantly In relative terms (from 87% of the EC average In 
1975 to 95% in 1985), although this trend was certainly linked to the sharp 
decline in employment. In this period relative employment fell 18 points to 
74%, which more than offset the relative improvement In labour 
productivity and reduced the income per capita to 70% of the EC average 
in 1985. As can be seen in graph 2, though the occupation rate declined 
steeply after 1977, the marked fali in the participation rate, provoked by 
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the disincentives to join the labour market in the recession, prevented an 
even more dramatic increase in unemployment. 
In the eighties Spanish economic policy was designed under a new 
strategy, which proposed a reinforcement of the opening-up to external 
competition and a full-range liberalization and deregulation of the 
economy. The accession into the European Community, which took place 
in 1986, represented the most decisive step in this direction. In the 
second half of the eighties Spain recorded a strong economic recovery, 
with activity growing more rapidly than in the rest of the EC. As a result, 
income per capita rose to 78% of the EC average in 1991 ,,). This process 
was due to a significant increase in relative employment, mirrored in an 
improvement in the relative occupation and participation rates, while 
relative labour productivity hovered between 90-95% of the EC average. 
This latter figure might suggest a fairly similar capital intensity ratio in 
the Spanish economy as compared to the EC average. 
Economic recession was again clearly felt in Spain in 1992 and 1993. 
The relative improvement in labour productivity was not able to 
compensate the steep fall in relative employment and the GDP per capita 
declined from Its 1991 peak"). Increases in relative productivity (based 
on the strong capital widening of the Spanish economy in the eighties) do 
not appear to suffice to sustain the real convergence process in the 
medium term if relative employment does not increase. 
2.3. Differences between population and employment-based indicators 
As observed above, the catching-up picture is very different 
depending on whether population or employment-based indicators are 
considered. In particular, Spanish wages and productivity levels per 
(l) In all the calculations presented here, East Germany has not been 
taken into account to obtain the EC average. If it were, the relative 
income per head in Spain as compared to the EC average would increase 
by some two percentage points (e. g. to 80% in 1991). 
") The figures for 1994 and 1995 are based on the Spring Economic 
Forecasts of the European Commission. 
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worker are much closer to the EC average than the GDP per capita, as can 
be observed in table 1 and graph 3. On the one hand, the GDP per worker 
and the average compensation per wage earner were both around 95% of 
the EC average in PPS terms in 1993. On the other hand, in that year the 
GDP per capita was 76% of the EC average. This difference was even 
larger in 1985, when the GDP per worker and the compensation per 
employee were around 95% of the EC average while the GDP per capita was 
25 points lower (70%)'5) . 
As suggested in the last section, this sharp contrast is mainly due 
to the low proportion of employment to total population in Spain as 
compared to the EC countries. In 1993 only 32% of the Spanish population 
worked as compared to 40% in the Community. In 1985 the difference had 
been larger: 29% in Spain as compared to 39% for the EC average"). 
As observed in graph 1, in the last twenty years relative labour 
productivity only rose when relative employment declined. This negative 
correlation between productivity and employment appears more clearly if 
domestic variables are examined. Thus, in graph 4 ,  the changes in 
Spanish labour productivity and employment recorded since 1981 show 
that, on average, half of the reduction in employment is absorbed by a 
higher labour productivity. Given the hypothesis of diminishing returns, 
the lower short-term flexibility to adapt capital investment to output 
changes as compared to labour force leads to a decline (rise) in labour 
(5) Among the catching-up countries, Portugal differs most 
diametrically from the Spanish case: while its labour productivity is 
around 60% of the EC average, Portuguese relative employment is around 
the Community average. 
") The striking differences between the productivity, wage and 
employment levels in Spain could be partially explained by the existence 
of a higher share of underground economy in Spain as compared to other 
European countries. Given that these activities are concentrated on 
traditional sectors with a low specialization, the actual labour productivity 
and wage per head of the overall economy would be probably lower than 
those calculated here and the relative employment somewhat higher. The 
inclusion of the underground activities would also imply a certain upward 
revision in the overall GDP per capita figures. 
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TABLE 1 
DIfFERENT ASPECTS OF THE CATCHING-UP PROCESS IN SPAIN 
EUR12-100 
'''' 1975 1980 1985 ,_ 1993 
L GOP per capita in PPS <YIP) ",- 79,4 n,_ 70,4 74,8 75,7 
2_ GOP per worker in PPS (YIN) 73,9 ",7 90,1 95,2 91,7 94,0 
3_ Occupied to total population (NIP) 92,2 91,6 79,9 74,0 81,8 80,3 
Spain 39,1 36,9 32,2 29,_ 33,6 31,8 
EUR 12 42,4 40,3 40,3 39,2 41,1 39,6 
4_ COII'4)ensat i on per employee In PPS 77,9 90,7 96,7 96,6 91,6 93,3 
MEMORANDUM ITEM 
Difference between Eeu rate & PPS 53,4 30,3 23,6 29,3 9,. 16,6 
Source: Eurostat and Conmission services. 
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productivity in the buoyant (recessionary) phase of the cycle. However, 
the more volatile changes recorded by Spanish labour productivity as 
compared to other European countries might point to a higher sensitivity 
of Spanish employment to changes in the economic cycle. 
However, this anti-cyclical nature of labour productivity in Spain 
does not seem to have been based on a more flexible working of the labour 
market. On the contrary, in the two oil-crises the rigid labour market and 
sticky labour costs reinforced the substitution o� capital for labour, 
accelerating the employment decline. Thus, unemployment rose steeply 
from 4.5% of the labour force in 1975 to 21. 8% in 1985. This substitution 
allowed companies to increase productivity per worker very rapidly while 
those who could maintain their job preserved a continuously rising wage 
(as seen in table 1 and graph 5, compensation per employee rose from 91% 
of the EC average in 1975 to 97% in 1985 while relative employment 
plunged) . 
In the expansionary phase of the late eighties employment creation 
was enhanced by the introduction in 1985 of new subsidized contracts 
(mainly temporary) which further allowed some reduction in wage 
pressures: the proportion of employment to popUlation thus grew from 74% 
of the EC average in 1985 to 82% in 1990, while compensation per employee 
declined to 92% of the EC average. 
These employment, wage and productivity indicators offer the 
picture of an economy with a comparatively small labour force base which 
has been further hit in the recessionary phases by a rigid labour market. 
As wages do not show adequate flexib!l!ty, firms tend to reduce unit 
labour costs shedding labour. Thus, the workers who can maintain their 
posts record a relatively high productivity and receive a comparatively 
high wage, measured in terms of purchasing power. The introduction of 
temporary contracts in the mid-eighties was only a short-lived response 
to the need for higher flexib!l!ty in the labour market: it allowed an 
expansion of employment in the upturn but this was completely reversed 
in the early nineties as that reform introduced new rigidities in the 
working of the labour market, giving more power to the permanent 
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workers, and could not preserve competitiveness (see Bentolila and 
Dolado, 1993). 
As already noted above, the catching-up process is driven by the 
economic growth differential, if relative population is assumed to remain 
constant. However, this process appears to be more sustainable if it 
allows for an expansion of employment, even at the cost of a reduction in 
relative productivity, than vice versa(7). 
On the one hand, it is obvious that the capitalization of the Spanish 
economy in the last decade, which allowed high productivity gains, 
contributed to the catching-up process through an upgrading of 
production, which ultimately resulted in a better remuneration of the 
factors employed, i. e. higher real wages and profit margins. 
Conversely, the relative labour productivity in Spain (I. e. the 
capital intensity per worker) could be considered as excessive for a 
country with such a high unemployment rate. In this respect, the 
impediments to a more flexible use of labour resources, in terms of legal 
and cost barriers, could have endangered the prospects of the 
labour-intensive enterprises and promoted the substitution of capital for 
labour; excessive labour cost increases could have demanded high 
productivity levels, producing negative effects on employment. The 
resulting factor combination would thus have little bearing on the 
abundant Spanish labour force and would be close to that existing in most 
industrialized countries. In this respect, the activity of the transnational 
companies has surely represented a factor of homogenization of the 
Spanish productive structure in the last few years. 
A greater emphasis on employment in the run-up to real 
convergence seems appropriate for a number of reasons: 
(7) This is due to the fact that the catching-up in Spain records a pro­
cyclical bias: the Spanish GDP per capita grew at a higher rate than in 
the EC in the expansionary phases of the sixties and the second half of 
the eighties whereas it declined comparatively between 1975 and 1985 and 
in the recession in the early nineties. 
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first, given that relative labour productivity is close to EC levels 
while employment Is very far from it, it seems reasonable to give 
priority to the increase in relative employment though It could lead 
In the short term to a decline in relative productivity. Wage 
moderation appears to be a crucial element to foster labour demand. 
As shown by graph 3, since 1975 higher compensation per employee 
(linked to progress in relative productivity) has not been 
positively correlated with an increase in the relative GDP per capita 
but just the opposite. In fact, the increases (reductions) in the 
compensation per employee led to a worsening (improvement) in the 
catching-up process. 
second, a higher employment content of economic growth would 
allow for a better income distribution, smaller output fluctuations 
and reduce the burden of social expenditure on budgetary policy 
and social unrest. 
third, the data available show that in the last twenty years 
progress in the catching-up process only took place when relative 
employment increased; by contrast, the increase in relative 
productivity was linked to the worsening in the real convergence 
process. 
Thus, it seems reasonable to attribute the prominent role in the real 
convergence process to the creation of employment. As graph 5 suggests, 
labour cost moderation would foster employment and prevent the tendency 
to reap productivity gaIns and reduce unit labour costs by means of 
shedding labour. 
Summing up, the waste of labour resources appears as the most 
important factor explaining Spanish backwardness. The transition from 
a protected economy operating at low productivity levels to a deregulated 
one could be viewed as inevitably requiring a far-reaching adjustment in 
employment, such as the one that actually took place from 1975 to 1985. 
After that period, labour productivity was close to the levels recorded by 
Spain's main trade partners though relative employment was much lower. 
Nowadays, the point Is to identify the best conditions to allow for a 
-20-
permanent expansion of production and its employment content. On the 
one hand, development of the capital and technological base is needed to 
sustain output growth and to prevent productivity gains from emerging 
solely from Isbour shedding. On the other hand, if the relstive prices of 
productive factors mirrored to a Isrger extent the current Isbour market 
situation in Spain, economic growth would have a higher employment 
content than at present. The parallel development of Isbour productivity 
and employment would thus represent the best scenario for enduring 
progress in the real convergence process. 
2.4. The Spanish competitive position 
The competitiveness of the Spanish economy has traditionally been 
hased on the prevai1ing lower level of Isbour costs and prices. Generally 
speaking, this implies tbat wages providing the same purchasing power 
are lower in Spain than in the EC at the current exchange rates; the 
peseta exchange rate is undervalued as compared to its purchasing 
power. Thus, in 1993, compensation per employee in Spain was 93% of tbe 
EC average in PPS terms, though at the current exchange rates (in ECU 
terms), which are those to be considered in assessing competitiveness, 
it was below 80% of that average (see graph 6). Obviously, lower total 
costs per unit of output, and thus higher competitiveness, are more likely 
to create an effective competitive advantage in the Isbour-intensive 
sectors while in others there could be other factors (such as human 
capital, infrastructure, financlsl costs, etc.) which could offset tbat 
Isbour cost advantage. 
The nominal advantage due to the lower price level could be proxied 
by the difference between the exchange rate of the peseta and its value 
in terms of PPS (see Memorandum Item in table 1). Changes in that 
difference correspond to the varistions in the real effective exchange 
rate: higher inflation as compared to the EC and/or the appreciation of 
the peseta narrow the difference between the exchange rate and the PPS 
magnitudes, weakening the nominal competitive advantage. 
Given that Spanish productivity is close to the EC average, this 
nominal advantage also leads to lower relstive unit Isbour costs in the 
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Spanish economy (see graph 7). This advantage, however, does not 
automatically lead to a higher competitiveness of Spanish output, even 
though only price considerations are taken into account. As concerns 
prices, labour is not the only productive factor; capital endowment, 
infrastructure and geographical situation also play a major role in 
determining final prices. On the other hand, competitiveness is also 
influenced by non-price considerations, such as quality or design, which 
depend on the technological content of output and manpower skills. 
The real convergence process might lead to a reduction in the 
nominal advantage of the Spanish economy if real wages increase more 
than abroad. However, to make this process durable wages should catch 
up slowly and in parallel with the improvement in the other non-labour 
factors. Wage pressures, if not based on productivity gains J discourage 
investment and employment, bring to a halt the catching-up process and 
generate internal and external imbalances (inflation and a deficit on 
current account). Finally, these imbalances often require a painful 
process of economic adjustment to restore the macroeconomic equilibria. 
A process of this nature took place in Spain in the second half of 
the eighties when higher price and wage inflation, together with the 
strength of the peseta, led to an increase in the labour costs per worker 
as compared to the EC countries, measured in a common currency, which 
did not run in parallel with a similar improvement in real productivity. 
The Spanish nominal advantage in terms of unit labour costs declined from 
22 points in 1987 to 7 points in 1992 (see graph 7). The continuous loss 
of competitiveness recorded since 1987 contributes to explain the large 
external deficit and the strong pressures against the peseta which finally 
led to its devaluation in 1992 and 1993. This depreciation stopped the 
worsening in relative unit labour costs and the external balance though 
a more permanent effect on competitiveness will oniy take place if prices 
and wages moderate significantly. 
2.5. Prospects for the catching-up process 
The perspective of an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in 
Europe towards the end of the nineties is regarded by the Spanish 
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authorities as an important contribution to stimulate the catching-up 
process in the medium term. A stable nominal framework, it is argued, 
such as that required by the Maastricht criteria, is essential to attain a 
sustained economic growth. In this sense, the EMU process exerts 
positive external pressure to tackle the reforms needed to achieve a 
further degree of nominal stability. The growing integration in the EC, 
further enhanced by the European Single Market, makes nominal stability 
most necessary to preserve agents' confidence and maintain a sustained 
economic growth in the medium term. 
The countries which have relatively cheaper labour costs and are 
less developed might initially be considered as offering a greater variety 
of opportunities to attract investment which should allow them to record 
a positive growth differential as compared to the EC core. On theoretical 
grounds, however, the effect of the single market and EMU on the 
economic growth of the catching-up countries is controversial. Some 
authors, such as Krugman and Venables (1990) and De Ia Dehesa and 
Krugman (1992), have stressed the likely increase in regional divergence 
in the EC in the wake of EMU . The removal of trade barriers would allow 
the transnational firms to sell their goods in any peripheral country 
without the need to produce there. Moreover, the better human capital, 
infrastructure and location enjoyed by the core countries could offset the 
labour cost advantages of the catching-up countries. Henceforth, the 
EMU framework might bring about a higher concentration of production 
(in particular in the manufacturing sector) in the richer areas. On the 
contrary, as stressed by the Commission Report 'One market, one money' 
(1990), technological developments make companies less constrained by 
geographical costs, and this could enhance investment in those regions 
with lower variable (labour) costs, which are normally those in the 
periphery. Moreover, the financial support provided by the EC structural 
funds should significantly contribute to increase infrastructure and 
human capital in the lagging regions, thus reducing their structural 
disadvantages. 
The decentralization of production does not only depend on the 
labour cost advantages offered by the catching-up countries but also on 
other features which allow foreign companies to shift their productive 
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structure at a profit. As shown by Bajo and Torres (1992), the huge flow 
of foreign direct investment attracted by Spain in the eighties was not 
only driven by the relatively cheaper Spanish labour costs but by the size 
of the Spanish market and the economic growth expectations. Other 
factors J such as the adequate training and formation of the labour force, 
appeared to be more important than the level of labour costs. 
In short, to ensure the economic growth differential with the EC 
average, which is needed to progress in the real convergence process, 
headway in two fields seems to be essential. Firstly, the lower level of 
labour costs should be preserved in order to sustain the competitiveness 
of the domestic sectors and contribute to increase the too-low level of 
relative employment. As stressed by Krugman and Venables (1990), the 
lower the flexibility in relative wages between the peripheral regions and 
the centre, the stronger the tendency to concentrate production in the 
centre. Secondly J non-wage competitiveness features (such as more 
flexible markets, improvement of infrastructure and human capital), 
which increase productivity, should be enhanced to make Spain more 
attractive as a place to establish industries(·). 
2.6. A sectoral outlook 
From 1980 to 1990 total employment rose by 8.5% in Spain, as it 
declined by 7.5% from 1980 to 1985 and soared by 17% in the second half 
of the eighties (see graph 8). However, the 1992-93 recession made the 
Spanish economy lose around one third of the employment created in the 
previous upturn. Employment in the eighties was mainly created in the 
service sector, typicalIy the most labour intensive sector and that with 
lowest productivity. Employment in services increased by 30% in the 
eighties, boosted mainly by general government employment which rose 
by 45%. By contrast, employment in agriculture declined by 34% while in 
industry it felI slightly. The composition of vaiue added and employment 
by sector is shown in graphs 9 and 10. 
(') As Sapir (1990) stressed: 'being peripheral is not irreversible'. 
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This shift of resources from agriculture to services, while labour 
requirements in industry gradually declined, has been a feature common 
to most western countries in the last few decades. The relatively larger 
and less productive agricultural sector and the decentralization process 
which took place in the public sector led Spain to experience further 
important changes in the proportion of employment by sector in the 
eighties. 
The service sector contributed only modestly to productivity 
expansion but reaped a good amount of the labour cost increase. Raymond 
(1992) showed that, from 1970 to 1990, productivity in the industrial 
sector increased by 50% more than in services, while the relative prices 
of industrial goods against services halved in the same period. The 
different performance of productivity and prices allowed labour costs per 
employee to increase at very s!m!Jar rates in both sectors in the last two 
decades, though in the manufacturing industry in some periods it was at 
the cost of cutting the profit margin. On the one hand, the higher 
productivity recorded in the industrial sector was offset by the lesser 
ability to increase prices due to foreign competition; on the other hand, 
the service sector could compensate its lower productivity with higher 
freedom to fix prices as a Significant share of services· were sheltered 
from external, and even domestic, competition. Wage increases thus 
appeared as scarcely dependent on productivity gains by sector. 
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3. THE CATCHING-UP PROCESS IN THE MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 
In addition to the traditional analysis of the catching-up process 
(linked to the relative levels of GDP per capita) presented above, a 
sectoral approach to this process is also made here. Thus, in terms of the 
manufacturing industry the catching-up could be defined as the increase 
in the Spanish industrial value added per capita as compared to the EC 
average(9). As previously with the overall real convergence process, 
this manufacturing value added per capita may be split into the 
productivity per worker and the proportion of manufacturing employment 
to total population. 
As observed in graph 11, there is a big difference between the 
productivity level, which is around the EC average throughout the whole 
period(lO), and relative employment, which is below 75% of the EC 
average. If compared ·with the overall catching-up process (see graph 
12), four periods may be identified in the lsst decade: in the first half of 
the eighties real convergence ran at similar rates for the total economy 
and the manufacturing sector; from 1985 to 1987 the industrial sector 
contributed significantly to the overall catching-up process as relative 
productivity and employment increased; thirdly, from 1988 to 1992 
industrial real convergence stagnated whereas catching-up for the total 
economy continued its upward trend; and finally, the depreciation of the 
peseta and the recession redressed the share of industrial production in 
total output. 
(0) Industrial data from Greece and Ireland were not available. Thus, 
in all the calculations presented here, the EC average has been 
constructed without these two countries. 
(10) The comparison in industrial productivity has been made adjusting 
the 1980 national manufacturing value added by the PPS in that year and, 
for the rest of the period, applying to the 1980 level the changes in the 
value added per worker at constant prices. If the base year were 
different, the level of relative productivity in the manufacturing industry 
would also be different. Therefore, the following analysis should only be 
considered as a general approach which tries to show the main tendencies 
in the manufacturing industry as compared to the total economy. 
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As observed in graph 13, the ratio of manufacturing employment to 
population is below the ratio recorded for total employment, which is a 
signal of the smaller industrial base in Spain. However, though st!11 far 
from Community levels, the expansion in Spanish employment in the last 
few years has been relatively more concentrated in manufacturing, as 
compared to the EC (see graph 14). In any case, the proportion of 
manufacturing employment to total employment in Spain has followed the 
same structural downward tendency observed in the other EC countries 
(see graph 15). 
Curiously, despite the expansion in the Spanish industrial 
structure in the second half of the eighties, there was no progress in the 
industrial real value added per capita as compared to the EC countries. 
The boost in manufacturing employment was accompanied by a reduction 
in relative productivity per worker, notwithstanding the strong 
investment process which took place in that period. Thus, it seems that 
a large productive capacity was created, in expectation of a sustained 
growth in domestic and foreign demand. In the 1992-1993 recessionary 
phase, that productive capacity became excessive making it possible to 
reap high productivity gains by shedding labour. 
The nominal competitive advantage in unit labour costs in the 
Spanish manufacturing sector is higher than that calculated for the 
economy as a whole (see section 2.4). While productivity per worker was 
higher in industry than in the rest of the economy, the relative 
compensation per employee in PPS terms remained clearly below the 
figures for the whole economy (see graph 16). Moreover, the difference 
between the relative compensation per employee in industry and the whole 
economy doubled from 6 percentage points in the early eighties to more 
than 12 points in 1993. This lower compensation per employee in Spanish 
industry does not reflect a domestic differentiation of labour costs in 
Spain but mainly a relatively higher level of industrial wages in the EC. 
The Spanish manufacturing industry is thus characterized by a 
combination of a high relative productivity and lower labour costs per 
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employee which, however, coexists with a smaller employment base(l1) . 
As commented above, the unit labour cost advantage is not a sufficient 
condition to exp�ct an extension of industrial activities and employment; 
a strengthening of the structural conditions leading to an increase in 
investment also seems essential. 
In the following chapters a detailed analysis of the Spanish 
manufacturing industry is made splitting the sector into branches and 
examining the main economic variables affecting their performance . The 
higher share of traditional sectors in Spanish industry and the lack of 
adaptation to the new competitive requirements stemming from a high 
economic integration will appear as the main factors explaining the poor 
industrial performance after the entry into the EC and the scarce 
contribution made by the Spanish manufacturing sector to the overall 
catching-up process, leading to the strong adjustment of 1992 and 1993. 
(11) As earlier seen, productivity and employment performances are not 
independent . To a certain extent, high labour productivity in Spanish 
manufacturing industry is the result of widespread labour shedding in 
traditional sectors . 
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4. THE DOMESTIC PERFORMANCE OF THE MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 
4.1. Methodology 
The data on the manufacturing industry analyzed here are from the 
national accounts according to the NACE-CLIO R-25 classification which 
considers 13 non-energy industrial activities (see annex 1). These 
branches are regrouped by EUROSTAT attending to the growth of demand 
in each sector. Thus, according to the real growth of domestic demand for 
these manufacturing branches in the nine biggest OECD countries in the 
ten years from 1972 to 1982, those 13 branches are split into three 
groups : strong, medium and weak demand branches. More updated 
sources , different from national accounts, on industrial prices or on 
labour costs have also been analyzed. 
Apparent labour productivity has been obtained by reference to 
total employment and not to wage earners to prevent spurious composition 
changes between self-employed and employees from modifying 
productivity levels. Labour costs per worker include wages and social 
security contributions. 
At the time this paper was prepared, the latest data available on 
these variables with the required detail by branches for Spain referred 
to 1990 . More recent information has also been used, though the link with 
previous data should be made cautiously. There follows a static analysis 
of the situation of Spanish manufacturing industry in 1990 and an 
evaluation of the changes recorded from 1980 to 1993 . 
4.2. Static analysis 
The levels of productivity, labour costs per employee and the share 
of labour costs in value added are presented in table 2 divided into the 
three demand groups (the complete data for all the industrial branches 
are included in annex 2). These data show a positive correlation between 
productivity and labour costs per worker (see also graph 17). Those 
branches with productivity above the average recorded at the same time 
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TABLE 2 
THE SPANISH MANUF ACllJRING SECTOR 
TOTAL STRONG MEDIUM LOW 
1990 average manufacturin�IOO 
Value added per head 100.0 126.6 116.1 78.4 
Compensation per employee 100.0 122.7 104.9 87.3 
Compensation per employecf\.·a!ue added (%) 63.8 61.8 57.6 71.0 
Idem avenge manuf.-lOO 100.0 96.' 90.4 lilA 
Annual average growth rates 
Real Yalue added 1985180 0 .• 4 .• IA ·1.8 
1990185 3.' 5.2 3.8 3.2 
Employment 1985180 -2.6 -0.7 -2.5 -3.6 
1990185 2.7 3.8 3.2 1.5 
Labour produc\i\ity 1985180 3.3 5.3 4.1 1.8 
1990fS5 1.2 1.3 0.5 I.. 
Compenu.tion per employee 
1985180 12.7 12.9 13.0 12.4 
1990185 7.1 7.1 6.' 7.1 
Industrial prices 
1985180 11.7 11.5 12.1 lL7 
1990185 2.' 1.8 3.8 3.1 
Real unit labour costs (tILe deflated by industrial prices) 
1985180 ·2.3 -3.6 -3.1 -l.l 
1990/85. 2.' 3.' 2 .• 2A 
So-c�: NptiomJl ""COWIU .... d C-iuiOff �u.s. For 1990, fobolU" ron ;"a.,uu 
lin pr<»i�d by tJJ� ,.·"ft nI1'W)' (£SA). 
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higher-than-average labour costs per head , and vice-versa, with only 
two exceptions . It is also observed that the stronger the demand the 
higher the level of productivity and labour costs of the branch: 
productivity and labour costs per employee in strong demand branches 
were 27% and 23%, respectively, above the average, while in the weak 
demand branches those variables were 22% and 13% below the average . 
These results seem reasonable: strong demand sectors have a more 
advanced technology, higher capital-intensity per worker and higher 
labour productivity (also, their labour force is probably more skilled) . 
Hence t these workers can be better paid . 
A larger dispersion in productivity than in wages is observed 
within manufacturing: the regression line in graph 17 shows that on 
average if productivity increases by 20%, labour costs per employee do so 
by 10%. Thus, the proportion of labour costs to total value added is 
higher in the weak demand branches : 70% against some 60% in strong and 
medium demand branches. 
A higher share of labour costs in total value added in weak 
productivity branches is a logical result as these are relatively 
labour-intensive activities. Further , there is a close relationship between 
the size of firms and the demand group to which they belong as pointed 
out by Martin (1992). Thus, in 1985 the companies included in the weak 
demand group employed on average 11 workers while , in contrast, in the 
strong demand branches the average number of workers per firm was 45. 
This difference is partly explained by the greater ability of the strong 
demand companies to reap economies of scale increasing the size of the 
plant as compared to the more traditional weak demand group . 
Summing up, a positive correlation between productivity levels and 
labour costs per worker is observed in the Spanish manufacturing 
industry in static terms , though the level of labour costs across the 
branches tends to be less dispersed than that of productivity .  Strong 
demand branches record a higher intensity of capital per worker while 
labour costs represent a lower portion of total value added . Conversely , 
the smaller size of the average firm in the weak demand group is reflected 
in a lower capital content and higher unit labour costs. 
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4 . 3 .  Dynamic analysis 
4 . 3 . 1 .  Overall evolution from 1980 to 1993 
From 1980 to 1 990 employment in manufacturing industry (as 
provided by the national accounts) levelled off while both real output and 
productivity rose by 25% in cumulated terms . Labour costs per employee 
grew much faster than industrial prices (156% as compared to 101%). All 
these figures were , however, the result of differing trends in the 
manufacturing industry in the last decade . Finally, in the early nineties 
the recession hit Spanish industry with particular virulence. Thus, three 
periods can be identified in relation to some basic features: the 
continuation of the industrial adjustmen\ which had begun in the 
seventies (from 1980 to 1985); the opening-up of the Spanish economy 
after the entry into the EC together with the expansionary cycle (from 
1986 to 1990); and the gradual deceleration in economic growth (since 
1990). 
a) 1980-1985 
In this period high productivity gains were achieved through 
labour shedding while labour costs and prices were still on an 
expansionary trend . Likewise, employment in manufacturing industry 
decllned by 2 . 6% annually, which enabled productivity to expand by 3 . 3% 
(see table 2). Labour costs per employee and industrial prices grew at an 
annual rate of around 1 2%, thus allowing real unit labour costs to be 
reduced at an annual rate of 2.3% (see graph 19). 
The stagnation of domestic demand and the recovery of 
competitiveness through the devaluation of the peseta in 1982 contributed 
to boost the exports of manufactures which increased in real terms at an 
annual rate of 7.5% in the first half of the eighties, while imports rose by 
oniy 3.6%. This evolution led to an increase in the degree of openness of 
the manufacturing industry, measured as the sum of exports and imports 
of industrial goods as a percentage of GDP, from 13 . 3% in 1980 to 1 8 . 5% in 
1985. 
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b) 1986-1990 
The upsurge in world demand contributed to the increase in 
production and employment in Spain, while economic policy tried to temper 
the inflationary pressures stemming from the strong domestic demand . 
This recovery in economic activity coincided with Spanish EC membership 
which led to a significant increase in its trade and financial flows with the 
rest of the world. The openness of the Spanish manufacturing industry 
increased from 18.5% in 1985 to 21.5% in 1990'lZ) . 
The effects of economic expansion on Spain were reinforced by the 
huge flow of foreign direct investment , which contributed to the 
introduction of modern management techniques and the rationalization of 
production , enhancing the ability of Spanish industry to compete in the 
international markets . This competitiveness boost is, however t being 
partially offset by the higher import propensity shown by foreign-owned 
companies 8S compared to national firms . This could be a consequence of 
the international commercial strategy followed by transnational companies 
and the particular relationship between subsidiaries and parent 
firms{13 1 .  
Real value added and employment recorded a high growth in this 
period (3. 9% and 2. 7%, respectively, in annual average terms ) . However, 
the industrial output per capita as compared to the EC average did not 
record any significant progress: the reason is that the higher employment 
" 2) Notice that this measure of the degree of openness leads sometimes 
to paradoxical results : from 1980 to 1985 the openness of the Spanish 
manufacturing sector increased by more than five points while in the 
second half of the eighties, after EC entry, openness only rose by three 
points . The strong increase in domestic demand since 1986 which 
tempered the upward export trend and boosted GDP growth was the main 
factor which explalned the deceleration of the openness in manufacturing 
trade in that period . 
(13) The clear-cut bias to import by the foreign-owned companies is 
observed in other countries. For instance , the subsidiaries of Japanese 
firms established in the United States record a significantly higher import 
demand per unit of output than US firms. 
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could not offset the relative decllne in labour productivity. Higher 
competition stemtcing from the opening up of the Spanish economy 
contributed to the steep deceleration in industrial prices , which reduced 
their rates of growth from 11. 7% in 1980-85 to 2.9% in 1986-90. The rate 
of growth of labour costs halved in the second half of the eighties fs111ng 
from 13% in the previous period to 7%. Despite further productivity gsins 
and significant slowing in labour cost increases ,  the much faster 
deceleration in industrial prices led to an increase in real unit labour 
costs of almost 3% in annual average terms . 
c) 1990-1993 
As observed in graph 19, while real unit labour costs continued 
declining for the totsl economy, a sharp upsurge in real unit labour costs 
in manufacturing industry was recorded after 1989, as productivity could 
not offset the growing differentisl between the compensation per employee 
and industrisl prices (see Gordo and L'Hotellerie, 1993). 
Compounded with this lack of moderation in manufacturing labour 
costs , Spanish industrial competitiveness was further hit by the relative 
strength of the peseta. Industrial enterprises tried to preserve their 
profit margins shedding labour and reaping high productivity geins as a 
way to check unit labour costs, a phenomenon witnessed especislly in 1992 
and 1993 when domestic demand fell dramaticslly. In consequence, 
manufacturing employment decllned by 14% in the early nineties .  Though 
the peseta devaluation has temporarily relieved the pressure on profits, 
a much more synchronized evolution of industrisl prices and labour costs 
seems to be necessary to widen the employment base in the manufacturing 
industry in the future . 
4.3.2. Analysis by branch 
In the eighties employment and productivity increased more in the 
strong demand branches than in the medium and weak demand groups (see 
table 2). Res1 vslue added in the strong demand branches rose at an 
average rate of 5%, while for the weak demand sectors it only grew by 
0. 7%. Productivity also rose more in the strong demand sectors in the 
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eighties (3.3% annually on average) compared to the medium and weak 
demand ones (2.2% and 1. 7%, respectively) . 
While in static terms a certain positive correlation between the level 
of labour costs and productivity was found, only a weak positive 
correlation is observed in dynamic terms . As shown by graph 18, there 
is only a slight relationShip linking higher increases in labour costs to 
higher productivity gains . In any case, the very small gradient of the 
curve (around 10%) would suggest that the role played by productivity 
gains in the wage-setting mechanism has not been significant . 
As shown by Bajo and Torres (1992), foreign direct investment in 
the manufacturing industry was mainly targeted on the strong demand 
sectors . Representing only 18% of total value added in the manufacturing 
industry, firms of the strong demand group received one third of foreign 
direct investment in manufacturing industry . On the contrary, only 18% 
of direct foreign investment in the manufacturing industry was directed 
to weak demand branches which produced 36% of total value added. The 
great significance of this foreign capital inflow is better understood if it 
is compared with fixed capital investment : from 1986 to 1990 the net flows 
of foreign direct investment accounted for one half of gross capital 
formation in the manufacturing industry . In the high demand branches 
this ratio reached 97%(14}. 
The large flow of foreign investment contains , however, some 
features which tend partially to offset the possible positive effects on the 
external accounts . In particular, foreign direct investment contributed 
to the appreciation of the peseta, increased the present and future value 
of the factor income paid to non-residents and, as mentioned above, 
induced a higher level of imports as demand in foreign-owned companies 
was biased to imports. 
(14) It should be observed , however, that not all the foreign direct 
capital flows aim to increase fixed investment and thus the ratio presented 
here could exceed 100%. 
- 43 -
, 
5 .  A COMPARISON BETWEEN SPAIN AND THE MAIN EC COUNTJUES 
5 . 1 .  Methodology 
This chapter is devoted to the analysis of the performance of the 
manufacturing industry in Spain as compared to that of its European 
partners . As the necessary information was not available with the 
required detail for all EC countries and no EC average existed, a selection 
of the four biggest countries (Germany, France, Italy and United 
Kingdom) has been made, which will be referred to hereafter as EC4. 
Although the basis of comparison to analyze the process of Industrial 
catching-up was the EC average, some conclusions could also be drawn 
from the evidence provided by comparing Spain and the EC4 countries. 
In point 5. 2 a brief comparison between the Spanish and the EC4 
manufacturing industry in 1990 is presented. The evolution of this sector 
in the eighties is analyzed in point 5.3. Finally, in 5. 4, the revealed 
comparative advantages will allow an assessment of the actual 
competitiveness of Spanish industry and its link with traditional price 
determinants (real exchange rates) and with other non-price factors. 
5 . 2 .  Static analysis 
The relative size of the Spanish manufacturing sector as compared 
to the overall economy is quite similar to that of the main EC countries, 
with the exception of Germany. The percentage accounted for by 
manufacturing industry in relation to employment or total value added in 
France, Italy, the United Kingdom and Spain ranged between 20 and 22% 
In 1990. In Germany this percentage reached 30%. However, given that 
the proportion of employment to population is significantly lower in Spain 
than in EC4, the similar share recorded by industrial employment is 
compatible with a smaller industrial base in Spain . 
As in Spain, productivity and compensation per employee in EC4 
were higher in the strong demand sectors as compared to the medium and 
weak demand branches . However J there were some differences between 
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the industrial structures in EC4 and Spain in 1990 which would be useful 
to stress.  
First) the Spanish productive structure is more concentrated on 
lower demand sectors than EC4. Thus, in 1990 the weak demand sectors 
represented 47% of the manufacturing employment in Spain against 37% for 
the EC4 average. On the contrary, Spain had only 14% of total employment 
in strong demand branches compared to 19% in EC4 (see table 3). As 
Martin (1989) indicates, Spain is more specialized in sectors where the 
potential for reaping economies of scale is lower, which determines a lower 
level of labour productivity. Thus, a significant increase in 
competitiveness may not be achieved by improving the size of current 
structures but a shift of resources to other sectors should be 
accomplished(15) . 
Second, the range in productivity in Spain is much wider than in 
the EC4: value added per worker in the strong demand sectors is 61% 
higher than in the weak demand branches in Spain, while in EC4 this 
difference is 41%. This would suggest that technology and production 
techniques are less evenly distributed in Spain. It is also observed that 
the countries with a sounder industrial sector record a lower dispersion 
in their industrial structure : thus, labour productivity in strong demand 
branches in Germany is only 23% higher than in the weak demand firms . 
Third, despite its larger dispersion in productivity, compensation 
per employee in Spanish manufacturing industry by branches are as 
homogenous as in EC4. Labour costs per head in Spain are 40% higher in 
strong demand branches than in weak demand ones, while this percentage 
is 32% in EC4. This may suggest lesser attention to productivity gains in 
Spanish wage setting in relation to other European countries and a normal 
tendency of labour costs to remain relatively close whatever the 
productivity level may be. 
(15) As shown by Segura (1992), this productive structure was the 
consequence of the autarchic development of Spanish industry after the 
Second World War, when production was determined by domestic demand. 
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TABLE 3 
COMPARISON BETWEEN TIlE SPANISH MANUFACTURING SECTOR AND THE EC4 AVERAGE 
TOTAL STRONG MEDIUM LOW 
Employment per branch 1990 
Spain 100,0 13.8 39.6 46,7 
EC' 100.0 \9.4 43.3 31.2 
1990 EC4 averilge= 1 00 
Compensation per employee in PPS terms 79.3 84.2 80.0 19.2 
Differential in the annual average growth rates (Spain-EC4) 
Real value added 1985180 0.0 0.2 I. .{).7 
1990/85 0.' 12 1.1 0.1 
Employment 1985180 0.' 16 -0.0 0.6 
1990185 2.6 3.3 2.8 I' 
Labour productivity 1985180 -0.4 -1.5 15 -1.4 
1990185 -1.7 -2.1 -1.7 "�O 
Compensation per employee (national =cies) 
1985180 2.2 18 2.8 2.1 
1990185 10 0.' 10 1.3 
Industrial prices (national currencies) 
.1985180 '.6 5.6 5.' '.8 
1990185 0.0 .(I.' 0.1 .{)� 
Real unit labour costs (ULe deflated by industrial prices) 
1985180 -1.8 -1.9 -3.7 -J.2 
1990185 2.7 3.5 2 7  J.J 
SOlIn,; EurostiJl and Commission sff'l'icu_ 
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Fourth, Spanish labour costs per worker are below the EC4 average 
in aggregate terms (around 80% in PPS terms) .  This advantage is even 
higher if current exchange rates are considered given that the 
purchasing power of the peseta is stronger than that implicit in exchange 
rates. However t in some branches , Spanish labour costs in PPS terms are 
close to the EC4 levels and are even higher than those recorded in other 
countries. Thus, in 1990 compensation per employee in Spain in 'metallic 
minerals' was close to the EC4 average and 5% higher than in Germany . 
Likewise, Spanish labour costs per employee were higher than in the 
United Kingdom in 'mechanical engineering' , 'office machinery' and 
'electrical engineering' . 
Finally , the share of labour costs in total value added in Spain 
(64%) is similar to that of France or Italy though well below Germany's 
share ( 75%) ,,6) .  This suggests that the effect of the lower level of 
labour costs per employee in Spain, which would tend to reduce this 
share , is offset in some cases by the relatively poorer productivity of 
Spanish industry. 
Summing up , Spanish manufacturing industry experiences a higher 
dispersion of productivity than that of the EC4 average. There is a strong 
demand group of firms which might record relatively similar capital 
endowments and technology to those in EC4 while the weak demand 
branches would experience relatively lower productivity levels . The 
greater homogeneity of labour costs as compared to productivity leads to 
a lower (higher) labour cost share in total value added in the firms with 
high (low) productivity levels . The strong demand group , however, 
represents a smaller proportion of output and employment in the total of 
the manufacturing industry as compared to EC4, which leads to an overall 
lower labour productivity in the Spanish manufacturing industry . 
(16) This result is already adjusted for the greater proportion of self­
employed workers in total employment (12% in Spanish industry as 
compared to 7% in the EC4 average) • 
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5.3. Dynamic BDalysis 
Industrial output increased in all ccuntries in the eighties : while 
in Germany and France real value added increased between 12% and 15%, 
in Italy, United Kingdom and Spain it expanded by around 25%. The 
higher employment increases in Spain led apparent labour productivity to 
grow below the EC4 average (38% in EC4 ccmpared to 25% for Spain) . 
The increase in real value added in EC4 was concentrated on strong 
demand sectors (+51%) compared to a slow growth of the more traditional 
branches (+10%) . In Spain this feature was even more pronounced: 
production in the strong demand branches rose by 61 % while in the weaker 
demand ones it only rose by 7%. 
Most countries recorded a decline in manufacturing employment in 
the eighties . Only Germany and Spain recouped in the seccnd half of the 
last decade the level of employment existing in the early eighties . 
Manufacturing employment in Spain levelled off between 1980 and 1990 
while for the EC4 average it fell by 14%(17) . While in the first half of the 
eighties Spanish industrial employment decllned similarly to EC4 
countries, though less sharply , the particularly intense expansionary 
cycle in 1987-1990 made industrial employment grow at a rate 2 . 6% higher 
than in EC4 in the second half of the eighties (see table 3 ;  the detailed 
data for all industrial branches is presented in annex 3 ) .  The better 
situation of industrial companies after the strong adjustment in the ten 
years to 1985 and the introduction of incentives (temporary contracts and 
subsidies) to expand the labour force also contributed to the increase in 
Spanish industrial employment . 
This favourable performance in industrial employment in the seccnd 
half of the eighties t however J was not enough to make significant 
progress in the industrial catching-up process as labour productivity 
(17) However, in 1992 and 1993 a sharp process of labour shedding in 
Spanish manufacturing was recorded , with employment being reduced to 
below the 1980 figures . 
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lagged behind: in 1986-1990 labour productivity in Spain grew at an 
annual rate 2% lower tban in EC4 . 
The greater competition entailed by the removal of trade barriers 
and the relative strength of the excbange rate of the peseta were the main 
factors leading to the significant convergence in industrial price increases 
after 1986 . While in the first balf of the eighties industrial price increases 
were 4 . 6  points higher in Spain tban in EC4, in national currency terms, 
in the period 1986-90, this gap disappeared completely. Price increases 
were even below the EC4 average in strong and weak demand branches. 
Finally, real unit labour costs (whose inverse is a proxy for the 
profit margin) followed differing trends in the eighties. In the first balf 
of the decade, real unit labour costs in the manufacturing sector declined 
more in Spain tban in EC4 as the protection still in place and the 
depreciation of the peseta in 1982 made it possible to fix higher prices. A 
more rapid convergence in prices tban in labour costs, not explained by 
higher productivity gains, caused a worsening in the relative real unit 
labour costs in the second half of the eighties and, hence, a deterioration 
of profit margins. In graph 20 it is observed tbat, though in the EC real 
unit labour costs increased after 1989, its upward trend was much more 
moderate tban tbat recorded in Spain. 
The different evolution of industrial prices and labour costs led to 
a large increase in real wages as regards industrial and import goods. 
Though this probably led to an increase in the standard of living (durable 
goods consumption was boosted), its temporary nature remained relatively 
concealed. The instability of this process was, however, shown at 
different levels (decline of profit margins in firms, rising external deficit 
and doubts about its eventual financing) and contributed significantly, 
when economic growth decelerated in 1992, to the devaluation of the 
currency. 
The process of industrial catching-up was thus significantly 
affected by the opening-up of the Spanish economy after the accession to 
the EC . Foreign investment and optimistic expectations fostered the 
growth of Spanish manufacturing as Spain provided relatively lower 
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labour costs and a big domestic market. The investment boost did not 
lead, however, to significant growth in industrial output as compared to 
other countries as a rising share of the demand for industrial goods 
started to be supplied by foreign firms. As the following section describes 
in greater detail, the lack of adequate progress in Spanish 
competitiveness after the entry Into the EC is prohably the main reason 
explaining the poor role played by Spanish industry in supporting the 
overall catching-up process in the 1987-1992 period . 
5 . 4 .  Revealed comparative advantages (RCA)(18) 
From 1981 to 1992 the RCA of the Spanish manufacturing industry 
declined by 25 percentage points in relation to the world (see table 4 ) .  
While in 1981 1 0  out of the 1 3  Industrial branches recorded positive 
values, only two did in 1992, no branch showing an improvement in 
absolute terms in that period . The worsening was particularly large in the 
medium and weak demand sectors (-27 and -39 percentage points , 
respectively) while strong demand branches lost only 5 percentage 
points . By branches the largest falls were experienced by 'textile and 
footwear' (-67 p . p . ) ,  'food & drink' (-50 p . p . ) ,  'paper and printing' (-41 
p . p . ) ,  'metal articles' ( -39 p . p . )  and 'wooden industry and others' (-34 
p. p. ) .  'Chemical industry ' ,  'electrical engineering' and 'office machinery' 
were the branches which recorded a lower decline . 
In absolute terms , the most competitive enterprises of Spanish 
manufacturing industry were traditionally those of the weak demand 
group as they were more labour-intensive and labour costs were 
significantly lower than abroad . However, in the last few years this 
situation changed as the RCA in the medium demand group increased while 
in the weak demand branches they continued to fall . Thus, in 1992 the 
RCA in the medium demand branches, though negative, were above those 
(18) The revealed comparative advantage (RCA) in the sector 'I' is 
defined as: RCA, = [(X, - M,l /(X, + M,) l *100, where X and M, correspond respectively to exports and imports of sector i .  The index 
RCA varies between -100 (maximum disadvantage) and 100 (maximum 
advantage) . 
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TABLE 4 
SP AJN'S REVEALED COMPARATIVE ADY ANT AGE 
WORLD 
AVERAGE ANNUAL CHANGES 
INDUSTRIAL BRANCHES 1981 1985 1990 1992 1985181 1990/85 1992I9Q 
I .  Metallic minerals 12.8 17.3 -18.5 -13.7 1 . 1  -7.2 2.4 
2. Non-metallic minerals 32.4 36.4 10.1 16.4 1.0 -5.3 3.1  
3.  Chemical industry -26.3 -12.6 -3 1 . 1  -32.0 3.4 -3.7 -0.4 
4. Metallic products 24.0 2 1 . 1  -8.3 -14.7 -0.7 -5.9 -3.2 
5. Mechanical cngin=ing -7.3 -7.3 -41.5 -35.7 0.0 �.8 2.9 
6. Office machinery -55.2 -45.1 �2.2 -54.9 2.5 -3.4 3.7 
7. Electrical cngin=ing -33.7 -31.3 -44.4 -35.3 0.6 -2.6 4.6 
8. Transport equipment 24.8 35.3 2.9 6.8 2.6 �.5 2.0 
9. Food, drink & tobacco 27.8 21.3 -15.7 -21.9 -1.6 -7.4 -3.1 
10. Textile &. footv.QJ' 44.0 43.2 -3.0 -22.8 -0.2 -9.2 -9.9 
1 1 .  Paper & printing 19.3 11.7 -23.5 -21.4 -1.9 -7.0 l . l  
12. Plastics & rubber 21.2 30.3 -8.2 -14.8 2.3 -7.7 -3.3 
13. Wooden industry & others 0.9 4.7 -20.4 -33.5 1.0 -5.0 �.6 
DEMAND CLASSIFICATION 
TOTAL 6.4 9.3 -20.3 -19.0 0.7 -5.9 0.6 
STRONG: 3+6+7 -33.5 -25.6 -43.0 -38.1 2.0· -3.5 2.5 
MEDIUM: 5+8+9+ 1 1  + 12 16.8 19.9 -13.7 -10.4 0.8 �.7 1 . 7  
WEAK: 1+2+4+10+13 22.9 23.9 -8.9 -15.6 0.3 �.6 -3.4 
EC 
AVERAGE ANNUAL CHANGES 
INDUSTRIAL BRANCHES 1981 1985 1990 1992 1985181 1990/85 1992190 
I .  Metallic minerals -20.6 -18.9 -21.3 -16.2 0.4 -0.5 2.5 
2. Non-metallic minerals 8.8 12.7 6.0 12.6 1.0 -1.3 3.3 
3. Chemical industry -47.4 -30.4 -39.1 -40.6 4.3 -1.7 -0.8 
4. Metallic products -10.4 �.1 -24.2 -28.2 1 . 1  -3.6 -2.0 
5. Mechanical engineering -36.1 -32.3 -49.4 -44.8 0.9 -3.4 2.3 
6. Office machinery -54.2 -34.1 -46.4 -42.1 5.0 -2.5 2.2 
7. Electrical engineering -42.4 -28.7 -36.2 -28.4 3.4 -1.5 3.9 
8. Transport equipment 18.3 32.9 8.3 9.5 3.7 -4.9 0.6 
9. Food, drink & tobacco 26.7 32.1 -7.7 -16.8 1.3 -8.0 -4.6 
10. Textile & footwear 44.4 40.5 -0.5 -16.9 -1.0 -8.2 -8.2 
1 1 .  Paper & printing 15.8 11.9 -13.0 -16.2 -1.0 -5.0 -1.6 
12. Plastics & rubber 3.2 6.1 -18.1 -19.4 0.7 -4.8 -0.6 
13. Wooden industry & others 32.2 32.6 �.5 -16.1 0.1 -7.8 -4.8 
DEMAND CLASSlFICA TION 
TOTAL -9.3 0.1 -18.0 -16.4 2.4 -3.6 0.8 
STRONG: 3�+7 -47.0 -31.0 -39.6 -36.5 4.0 -1.7 1.5 
MEDIUM: 5+8+9+1 1+12 3.8 14.8 -10.3 -8.0 2.8 -5.0 1.2 
WEAK: 1+2+4+10+13 4.9 7.8 -11.2 -15.2 0.7 -3.8 -2.0 
SOWTCtI: sptzttilll C"J'OIOI' A"tltrmliu, JNE., Banco de Esp0A4 andC(»Itl'lfirli"" U¥VI� 
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of the weak demand ones . Though still recording the worst results , the 
RCA in the firms of the strong demand group have also improved since 
1990. 
These changes in the RCA may indicate a certain upgrading in 
Spanish manufacturing industry . Thus, resources are shifting from 
traditional activities to others with larger capital and technological 
content , higher value added, more possibilities to exploit economies of 
scale and better prospects as regards the expected demand in the 
international markets . 
The performance of manufacturing trade since 1981 can be divided 
into three different periods . In the first half of the eighties the RCA 
improved slightly (3 percentage points) as a consequence of weak 
domestic demand , the protection still provided to domestic production and 
the depreciation of the peseta, which amounted to 30% in cumulative 
terms . By contrast, the opening of Spanish markets to external 
competition after the entry into the EC in 1986 and the expansionary cycle 
as from 1987 led to a rapid worsening of the external balance . The decline 
in the RCA in the second half of the eighties (around 30 points) is 
explained more by the boost recorded in import demand than by a 
significant reduction in export activity. Thus while real exports 
decelerated from an annual rate of growth of 7.5% in 1980-85 to 5% in the 
second half of the eighties , real import growth soared from 3.6% to 23% in 
1986-1990. 
The fall of the RCA has decelerated markedly since 1990 in parallel 
with the slowdown in domestic demand . From that year to 1992 RCA rose 
by one percentage point and strong and medium demand branches, where 
foreign investment was preferably concentrated, recorded modest gains 
(5 and 3 points, respectively) . Weak demand branches , however, 
continued losing ground (-7 points) despite the significant deceleration 
in domestic demand . 
A number of factors can be identified to explain the sharp 
worsening in Spanish external trade that the RCA show, in particular in 
the second half of the eighties . The higher growth of domestic demand as 
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compared to the main trade partners ; the removal of trade barriers and 
the significant reduction in tariffs; and the relative strength of the 
peseta were all factors leading to the deterioration of the external 
accounts. From the industrial standpoint some other specific factors also 
contributed to the emergence of trade deficits :  
a)  Declining competitiveness in labour-intensive branches . The 
very negative figures recorded by some branches (such as 'textile 
and footwear' or 'wooden and other industries') might be explained 
by the obsolescence of their capital equipment and their relatively 
sticky labour costs. These features are common to a number of 
countries and stem from the structural shift of resources from low­
to high-value-added industries in the modern economies. Given 
that in these branches the ability to differentiate the product is 
small, competitiveness has to be gained basically through cost 
moderation. Thus, the supply of industrial goods with a low capital 
content is increasingly being furnished by the newly industria1ized 
countries (NICs) which experience a much lower level of labour 
costs . The lack of competitiveness of domestic production is well 
reflected in the greater deterioration of the RCA in these branches 
in the early nineties as compared to the second half of the eighties : 
it suggests that when domestic demand slows down, external trade 
may worsen in some branches if consumers shift their demand from 
domestic goods to cheaper foreign products. 
b) The huge investment that took place in the second half of the 
eighties led to a large increase in the demand for capital goods 
which was to a large extent provided by foreign supply (imports of 
capital goods increased at an annual rate of 22% in real terms from 
1985 to 1990) . This process was especially important for some 
branches such as 'mechanical engineering', 'electrical engineering' 
and 'office machinery' . The end of this investment cycle in 1990 and 
the improvement in the competitive stance of Spanish firms , 
brought about by that capital deepening, would explain the 
increase in the RCA recorded in these sectors in the last few years. 
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c) An important change in consumption patterns could also partly 
explain the poor performance of external trade in the second half 
of the eighties. The opening up of new markets provided a new 
range of goods previously unknown to Spanish consumers . The 
better quality and design of foreign products, accompanied by a 
certain measure of curiosity and 'snobberyt(19) J attracted a 
considerable demand in 'textile and footwear' ,  'wooden furniture 
and other', 'food & drink' and 'means of transport' .  From 1985 to 
1990 the imports of non-food consumer goods grew in real terms by 
27% annually . Obviously, this also mirrored the lack of response by 
Spanish producers to that new demand and , in particular, a 
relative worsening in non-price competitiveness factors . 
All these factors led to a relative decline in industrial output as 
compared to that of services . The absence of factors limiting price 
moderation in services, given the limited role played by foreign 
competition, together with the rapidly rising demand recorded by this 
sector, meant that economic resources were increasingly shifted towards 
services . As observed in graph 21,  there Is a certain link between the 
share of industrial production and the external halance of the nation : the 
lower the relative Industrial output the higher the external deficit . Thus, 
insufficient progress in industrial catching-up has also had consequences 
for the external accounts J which further stresses the importance of a 
strong manufacturing sector to make the overall process of real 
convergence endure . 
In any case , the decline in the RCA in the Spanish manufacturing 
industry after EC entry, despite the lower labour costs (and, possibly 
lower prices) J stresses the importance of non-price factors on 
competitiveness .  Furthermore , it suggests that in those sectors where the 
product can be differentiated, price considerations are not essential to 
compete . 
(19) Lluch (1992) refers to this consumption upturn as having a 
'Veblenian inertia ' .  
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GRAPH 21 
NET LENDING AND RELATIVE INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT 
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Accordingly, a thorough competitiveness policy should not be 
limited to enhancing price and cost moderation in the traditional way but 
should pay more attention to the improvement in the quality and design of 
the product , the capacity to innovate, marketing features , post-sale 
assistance and so on, which altogether would contribute to promote the 
'trade-mark' of the country (see Martin, 1989 ) . In this sense, the most 
important 'trade barrier' prevailing in the European single market is 
probably the high level of quality of production required by most 
countries. 
These increasingly important non-price competitive factors should 
be reinforced by the increase in public and private investment in human 
capital and research and development activities together with the support 
to companies in order to open international commercial networks, as 
proposed by Martin (19928) . As recently shown by Argim6n et aI. (1993) , 
public investment in infrastructures (transport and communications) 
contributes significantly to increase the productivity in the private 
sector. 
The improvement in competitiveness is seemingly the basic issue at 
which economic policy should aim in the future. Maule6n (1992) stressed 
the strong correlation existing between the catching-up process and the 
improvement in competitiveness .  On the one hand, domestic growth 
appears as highiy dependent on external growth, which suggests that if 
the catching-up process is to be preserved , the growth differential has 
to be sustained by other additional elements, which should be mainly 
competitiveness gains . On the other hand , higher domestic growth would 
normally result in higher external deficits, the correction of which calls 
for gains in competitiveness .  
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s. CONCLUSIONS 
The .process of increasing the relative GDP per capita in one 
country as compared to others , the so-called 'catching-upt process, can 
be seen as generated by the performance of relative labour productivity 
and employment . This real convergence process resumed in 1986 in Spain, 
coinciding with the accession to the EC, but the recent economic recession 
brought it to a halt . At present, Spanish GDP per capita is around 76% of 
the EC average . 
The different performance of the two components of the catching-up 
process in Spain must be stressed . Thus , Spanish labour productivity is 
notably close to the EC average while, by contrast, relative employment 
remains far from the Community level. So, Spain's backwardness is 
explained by the low proportion accounted for by employment in relation 
to the total population. The inability to use thoroughly the human 
resources available hinders the possibility of increasing the relative 
income of the country. Thus , employment creation should be emphasized 
as the main basis for the catching-up process. Moreover, the increase in 
employment would contribute decisively to a better income distribution 
with beneficial effects on fiscal policy and the overall standard of living. 
Lower relative employment J however, coexists with a level of 
compensation per employee (measured in PPS) close to that in the EC, 
which points to a clear segmentation in the labour market . Likewise, it has 
been shown that the increase in compensation per employee is related to 
the reduction in relative employment and the worsening in real 
convergence . Additional rises in compensation per employee as compared 
to the EC average would tend to discourage employment and weaken the 
competitive position of the country. 
The increase in employment needs to be supported by sustained 
progress on the competitiveness front , stemming both from price 
moderation and from the improvement in non-price competitiveness 
features . As regards labour costs, greater attention in wage setting to 
productivity considerations ,  the competitiveness stance of individual 
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companies and the performance of competitors' costs would substantially 
benefit the catching-up process . 
The catching-up process in the manufacturing industry, after 
running quite close to the overall real convergence process at the 
beginning of the eighties, stagnated in the years following Ec accession, 
notwithstanding the parallel investment boom, as the large productive 
capacity was not fully used and domestic demand was increasingly 
supplied by foreign producers . The lack of competitiveness of Spanish 
industrial output was at the core of the scant contribution made by this 
sector to the overall real convergence process and helps to explain the 
deterioration of the external accounts in the late eighties and early 
nineties . The peseta depreciation contributed to increase competitiveness 
and industrial output though further structural improvement in the 
industrial field Is still needed. In any case, given that external 
Imbalances often require a painful process of adjustment to restore the 
lost competitiveness ,  an adequate performance of the manufacturing 
industry seems essential to ensure the achievement of sustained progress 
in the catching-up process. 
The main conclusions stemming from the analysis of the 
manufacturing industry are as follows: 
- The proportion of manufacturing employment to total employment 
In Spain is similar (21%) to that in the biggest EC countries, with the 
exception of Germany . The notably lower level of labour costs (in terms 
of a common currency) should be maintained to protect competitiveness, 
favour the expansion of investment in manufacturing activities, and foster 
economic growth in other sectors (mainly construction and services) . 
- In general terms , there is some correlation between labour costs 
and productivity levels in the Spanish manufacturing industry . From a 
dynamic point of view, however J no clear correlation is observed between 
productivity gains and wage increases . 
- Employment and unit labour costs have often moved in opposite 
directions . In particular, the strong increase in employment from 1986 to 
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1989 coincided with a reduction in the rate of growth of unit labour costs. 
Unfortunately, in the early nineties unit labour costs deflated by 
industrial prices soared and employment resumed its fall . The 
depreciation of the peseta in 1992-1993 helped recoup competitivenes s ,  
redress the profit margin and smooth the negative effects of recession on 
employment. To prevent these effects from being short-lived, the 
competitiveness gains should be backed up by cost moderation. 
- The Spanish industry structure is more concentrated on weak 
demand activities than EC4 (Germany, France , Italy and United 
Kingdom) . Foreign direct investment , which concentrated relatively more 
on the strong demand group , helped to progress in the shift of resources 
from low to high-value-added activities . Larger productivity dispersion 
in Spain, attributable to a technology less evenly distributed, is not 
followed by the labour cost structure which is equally homogeneous . 
Labour costs per head remained well below the EC4 average both in PPS 
and ECU terms. However) in some sectors the compensation per employee 
in PPS terms exceeds that recorded by other EC4 countries. 
- Industrial price increases converged with those in the other 
European countries in the last few years . However, the pressures 
stemming from a higher growth of labour costs, in a setting where 
industrial prices were exogenously fixed and the exchange rate was kept 
strong, reduced the ability of industrial companies to compete. To keep 
prices under control, the manufacturing industry had to resort both to 
cutting margins (and henceforth investment) and obtaining productivity 
gains by shedding labour. 
- Though it was partly motivated by a domestic demand relatively 
stronger than in the main partners , the decline of the revealed 
comparative advantage (RCA) since EC entry pointed to a competitiveness 
problem . The competitive position of Spanish companies should be 
enhanced by a greater attention to non-price features which play a major 
role in the competitiveness of various sectors . In this respect , the large 
domestic market, currently very dependent on imports, is a good 
opportunity for the domestic firms to adjust their production to the new 
patterns of consumption. 
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ANNEX ! 
NAC£.CLlO DIVISIONS OF MANUFACtURING INDUSTRY 
BRANCHES 
STRONGD� 
Chemical industry 
Office machinery 
ElectticaI c:nginccring 
MEDruM DEMAND 
Mechanical engineering 
Means of transport 
Food &: drink 
Paper It. printing 
Plastic &. rubber 
WEAK DEMAND 
Metallic minerals 
Non-metallic minerals 
Metal articles 
Textile 8t. footv.'eal" 
Wooden induslIy &. others 
Sown,: E"rosltlt 
DESCRIPTION 
Chemical industry &: man-made fibres industry 
Office machinery. data-proocssina machinery &. instrument cnginccrin, 
Manufacture of motor vehicles, parts, and other means oftranspoIt 
Food, drink It tobacco industry 
Manufacture of paper and paper products; printing and publishing 
Processing of rubber and plastics 
Extraction and preparation of metalliferous ores 
Production and preliminary processing of metals 
Extractioo of mineB1s other than metalliferous 
Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products 
Manufacture of metal anicJ� 
Textile, leather aoods. footwear &: clothing industry 
Timber and wooclm furniture industry and other manufact. industries 
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